However, the total number of vehicles procured was projected to increase and subseqeuntly the amount of armor per vehicle would grow to meet the threat, there were concerns that there might not be enough steel.
Similarly, tire production was expected to reach 9, per month by February , but 20, per month could be needed to support production and replacement in the field. Replacement rates were not known. For example, DoD gave MRAP contracts a higher priority DX rating that required these contracts to be accepted and performed before all other non-priority government and commercial contracts.
DoD also allocated funds to procure an advance reserve of steel and to increase tire production capacity. In addition, some of the vendors and suppliers made corporate investments to maximize capacity. As of March all vehicles had come from the vendor without mission equipment, something that was not expected to change, and which required that the equipment be integrated onto vehicles before fielding.
The equipment was 20 percent of the total program cost and included items such as a tracking system that identified friendly forces and a system to jam improvised explosive devices. A large challenge was integrating the entire suite of mission equipment onto the vehicles in a timely manner. The GAO reported that as of the installation took an average of 21 days, but the goal was to reduce that to 7 days. The plan was to process 50 vehicles per day for a total of 1, vehicles per month.
The GAO also reported that in order to rapidly field the vehicles, DoD substantially reduced the normal scope of test and evaluation.
For example, there was no minimum requirement for vehicle reliability, and durability testing covered only hard surface miles and off-road miles in the first test phase. The procurement plan as of March placed 11, vehicles on contract before operational effectiveness and operational suitability were determined.
A ceremony was held at the Pentagon on 1 October , to mark the end of production of vehicles for the MRAP program. Nearly 28, vehicles based on 7 core variants had been produced in the preceding 5 years, with 24, vehicles fielded to Iraq and Afghanistan. The vehicles had been credited with saving thousands of lives. MRAPs are a family of vehicles produced by a variety of domestic and international companies that generally incorporate a "V"-shaped hull and armor plating designed to provide protection against the three primary kill mechanisms of mines and improvised explosive devices IEDs : fragmentation, blast overpressure, and acceleration.
These vehicles provide the best currently available protection against IEDs. These include: Category I vehicles, weighing about 7 tons and designed for use in urban environments, transports up to six personnel. Category II vehicles, weighing about 19 tons, for convoy escort, troop transport, and ambulance evacuation, transports up to 10 personnel.
Category III vehicles, intended to be used primarily route clearance and explosive ordnance disposal, weighing about Vehicles fitting these descriptions had been in use by the US Army and US Marine Corps by , but in very limited numbers and for specialized missions, such as Explosive Ordnance Destruction and other rout clearance work.
These vehicles quickly gained a reputation for providing superior protection for their crews, leading to a suggestion that similar vehicles might be a better alternative for transporting troops in combat than uparmored HMMWVs.
Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan were seen to prove that USMC unarmored ground vehicles were unsuitable to support combat operations. Mine warfare was nothing new to the US. However, mine related casualties skyrocketed to 33 percent during Vietnam and 26 percent for Somalia. According to audiotapes released in November , Abu Musab al-Zarqawi ordered his followers to "Block off all their main and secondary supply lines for these are their main arteries and ambush them along those routes for they are exposed and easy prey.
As a result the enemy adapted before the Corps got a chance to protect Marines. The Marine Corps responded to these guerilla tactics by with a proactive-reactive strategy in order to increase the survivability of vehicles. These armoring efforts provided an immediate response to the threat that saved lives and reduced casualties. However, it did not correct the deficiencies that still existed with the current ground tactical vehicle fleet.
The MAK and MAS kits were expected to afford the time needed to launch a counter-attack aimed at the heart of the problem: the vulnerability of the existing ground tactical vehicle fleet.
The existing ground tactical vehicle fleet did not have the survivability needed to support and sustain operations on the modern battlefield.
While the US had superior intelligence collection, training, and tactical skill, the enemy continued to exploit the vulnerability of Marines in the unarmored vehicle fleet. The most likely threat the Ground Tactical Vehicle Fleet GTVF was expected to encounter under the ship to objective maneuver STOM scenario was a combination of mines and small arms employed by unconventional forces operating in a non-contiguous battlespace.
EOD and engineers will be able to maneuver with speed, mobility and survivability equal with the ground maneuver forces within the Marine Air Ground Task Force. Even if the mine hit the Cougar, its passengers would stand a far better chance of survival due to the v-shaped hull design and other special features incorporated in the vehicle. By contrast the Buffalo MRAP, in use since was originally intended to be fielded only to engineer units, with the Army planning to stand up three Route Clearance Companies per year starting in FY07, for a total of 12 companies.
The Marine Corps Systems Command issued a request for industry bids in November for 4, vehicles, 2, for the Army, for the Navy and 1, for the Marine Corps. Ever since the military began using MRAPs in Iraq, the requirement has grown, as commanders realize how much better they are at protecting their personnel. In May the requirement was only By July , it had risen to 1, By November , it had risen to 4, By February , after the supplemental request was submitted, it rose to 6, One month later, the requirement went up again to the current level of 7, Every one in the military agreed on that number.
The Marines needed 3, of them. Each awardee would receive an initial delivery order for two test vehicles per Category to include associated vehicle support. The Government could place additional delivery orders for production vehicles. Vehicles procured under these contracts would be deployed to and supported in Iraq and Afghanistan. Initial test vehicles would be delivered no later than 60 days after contract award.
Logistics support would continue up to two years after fielding for test and any production vehicles. Work was expected to be completed January with options.
Contract funds would not expire at the end of the fiscal year.
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