Guggen- heim Foundation and the John D. MacArthur Foundation for supporting some of the re- search described in chapters 4 and 5. Wallace V. Friesen, with whom I have worked for more than twenty years, is equally responsible for the research findings that I report in those chapters; many of the ideas developed in the book came up first in our two decades of dialogue.
I thank Silvan S. Tomkins, friend, colleague, and teacher, for encouraging me to write this book, and for his comments and suggestions about the manuscript. I ben- efited from the criticisms of a number of friends who read the manuscript from their different vantage points: Robert Blau, a physician; Stanley Caspar, a trial lawyer; Jo Carson, a novelist; Ross Mullaney, a retired FBI agent; Robert Pickus, a political thinker; Robert Ornstein, a psychologist; and Bill Williams, a management consultant.
My wife, I discussed many of the ideas in the book with Erving Goffman, who had been interested in deceit from quite a different angle and enjoyed our contrasting but not contra- dictory views. I was to have had the benefit of his com- ments on the manuscript, but he died quite unexpectedly just before I was to send it.
The reader and I lose by the unfortunate fact that our dialogue could only occur in my mind. Telling Lies Adolf Hitler, the chancellor of Germany, and Neville Chamberlain, the prime minister of Great Britain, meet for the first time.
The world watches, aware that this may be the last hope of avoiding another world war. Just six months earlier Hitler's troops had marched into Austria, annexing it to Germany. England and France had protested but done nothing further. On September 12, three days before he is to meet Chamberlain, Hitler demands to have part of Czechoslovakia annexed to Germany and incites rioting in that country.
Hitler has already secretly mobilized the Ger- man Army to attack Czechoslovakia, but his army won't be ready until the end of September. If he can keep the Czechs from mobilizing their army for a few more weeks, Hitler will have the advantage of a surprise attack.
Stalling for time, Hitler conceals his war plans from Chamberlain, giving his word that peace can be preserved if the Czechs will meet his demands. Chamber- lain is fooled; he tries to persuade the Czechs not to mobi- lize their army while there is still a chance to negotiate with Hitler. After his meeting with Hitler, Chamberlain writes to his sister, ".
I thought it would be useful only for those working with mental patients. My study of lies began when the therapists I was teaching about my findingsthat facial expressions are universal while gestures are specific to each culture asked whether these nonverbal behaviors could reveal that a patient was lying. Every doctor dreads being fooled by a patient who commits suicide once freed from the hospital's restraint.
Their prac- tical concern raised a very fundamental question about human communication: can people, even when they are very upset, control the messages they give off, or will their nonverbal behavior leak what is concealed by their words? I searched my films of interviews with psychiatric pa- tients for an instance of lying.
I had made these films for another purposeto isolate expressions and gestures that might help in diagnosing the severity and type of mental disorders. All that will be left to identify the respected lawyer are her teeth and a fragment of clothing. Why not stage a pran. Nathan belongs to a shadowy organization with global ties and unimaginable resources.
Perfect for fans of Stieg Larsson and Jo Nesbo. Her body is found arranged in bed with her hands covering her eyes.
When a bloody hammer is discovered under her pillow, it appears that she was more than just a witness to the killing. But the case quickly descends into darker, more violent territory, leadin. Kim Otto is a great, great character - I love her. Otto and Gaspar are right behind her, and powerful enemies with their back.
Reacher set out to do a good deed for an Army officer in The Midnight Line. The road to hell is paved with good intentions. Now, five people are missing and one is dead. Joking lies, if they are not taken to be true, are not immoral. But if it be that the other is ever meant to believe it, then, even though no harm is done, it is a lie, since at least there is always deception. Other examples Kant gives of making untruth- ful statements that are not intended to be believed to be true are giving compliments, being gallant, and making excessively warm protestations of friendship: Courtesy politesse is a semblance of graciousness that inspires love.
That Kant is not consistent on this matter, however. This is true for two reasons. First, an untruthful statement that is made with the intention that it be believed to be true may be true. However, if an untruthful but true statement is believed to be true, then deception about its contents does not occur. Second, an untruthful statement whether true or false that is made with the intention that it be believed to be true may not be believed to be true—it may be disbelieved.
However, one is lying in this case, in the ethical sense and in the sense of right. Lying is not a perlocutionary act, in any of the three senses. Lying does not require a response of any kind, and in particular, does not require the response of being believed to be true, in order for it to be lying in any of the three senses. It is simply the making an untruthful statement with the intention that that statement be believed to be true.
It may well be that, in such a case, the person is deceived about what the liar believes and about what the liar intends. However, it is possible to imagine a case in which one knows that someone will lie about some matter, but in which one also knows that the person is mistaken about this matter, and that the lie will be true, although one does not know what the lie will be.
In such a case, when one believes to be true what the liar says, one is not being deceived about anything. The transgression of this duty of truthfulness is called lying, and, for this reason, there can be external lying as well as internal mendacity; as a result, it can happen that both sorts of mendacity are united or that they contradict each other. But lying, whether it be inward or out- ward, is of two kinds: 1 if one states something to be true that one knows to be untrue; 2 if one states something to be certain that one nevertheless knows to be subjectively uncertain.
AN, —42 [p. Hence, a lie in the ethical sense may be intentionally harmless to others, since it may be a lie to oneself. However, actions that are intentionally harmless to others are not punishable by law. Hence, a lie in the ethical sense may not be punishable by law, since it may be a lie to oneself. Hence, too, a lie is subject to judicial reprimand, at least an offence, but not as an untruth.
In ethics, though, every falsiloquium, every knowing decep- tion, is impermissible, even though it be not immediately coupled with an injury, and would not be imputable coram foro juridico [before a court of law]. In the Doctrine of Right, part 1 of The Metaphysics of Morals, Kant says that the original right that belongs to every person by virtue of her or his humanity is the right to freedom.
MM, —38 [p. Making an untruthful statement to a particular other person with the intention that this person believe it to be true does not, by itself, entail intending that this person be deprived of what is rightfully hers or his by believing it to be true. Not every untruthful statement is such that, if a person believes it to be true, it deprives this person of what is rightfully hers or his.
However, certain untruthful statements are such that, if a person believes them to be true, they deprive this person of what is rightfully hers or his. In the case of such an untruthful statement, making this untruthful statement to a particular other person with the intention that this person believe it to be true does entail intending that this person be deprived of what is rightfully hers or his by believing it to be true: Telling an untruth intentionally, even though merely frivolously, is usually called a lie mendacium because it can also harm someone, at least to the extent that if he ingenuously repeats it others ridicule him as gullible.
MM, n. It is a falsiloquium dolosum in praejudicum alterius, and it is punishable by law. Every lie in the juristic sense is also a lie in the ethical sense. However, most lies in the ethical sense are not also lies in the juristic sense. It is the making of an untruthful statement to others with the intention that others believe that Martin-Chap For it always harms another, even if not another individual, neverthe- less humanity generally, inasmuch as it makes the source of right unusuable [sic].
In law a mendacium is a falsiloquium in praejudicium alterius, and cannot be anything else there, but from the moral viewpoint it is a falsiloquium in praejudicium humanitatis. Whoever may have told me a lie—I do him no wrong if I lie to him in return, but I violate the right of mankind; for I have acted contrary to the condition, and the means, under which a society of men can come about, and thus contrary to the right of humanity.
Therefore, making any untruthful statement to others with the intention that others believe it to be true entails intending to harm See note Every lie in the juristic sense is a lie in the sense of right. However, not every lie in the sense of right is a lie in the juristic sense. In the case of some untruthful statements made to others with the intention that others believe them to be true, there is not an intention that particular other per- sons be harmed by believing them to be true, since there is not an inten- tion that particular other persons believe them to be true.
It is, for I promise to speak my mind, and if I fail to speak it truly, I do not, indeed, act in praejudicium of the particular individual concerned, but I do so act in regard to humanity. This is a lie in the sense of right, but it is not a lie in the juristic sense. Since the liar has forfeited his rights by his lie, one cannot intend to violate his rights by making an untruthful statement to him with the intention that he believe it to be true.
Another example of a lie in the sense of right that is not a lie in the juristic sense is publishing an untruthful statement about an event with the intention that it be believed to be true by others. Here there is no particular other person to whom the untruthful statement is made with the intention that it be believed to be true, and hence, no intention to violate the rights of a particular other person. However, it is intended that the right of humanity be violated: Martin-Chap But now since I cannot experience everything myself, if the reports of others were to be false tidings, the desire for knowledge could not be satisfied.
LE, —48 [p. This means that any untruthful statement made to others with the intention that it be believed to be true, even if it is not made with the intention to violate the rights of a par- ticular other person—either because it is not made to a particular other person, or because the particular other person to whom it is made has forfeited her or his rights—is punishable by law.
As Kant says about the lie in the sense of right to the would-be murderer: Such a well-meant lie. That is to say, if you have by a lie prevented someone just now bent on murder from committing the deed, then you are legally accountable for all the consequences that might arise from it. Everything turns out well—except, according to Kant, the house-owner may be charged with violating the juridical duty not to lie. While every lie in the sense of right is also a lie in the ethical sense, not every lie in the ethical sense is also a lie in the sense of right.
In particular, lies to oneself are not lies in the sense of right. With a lie in the ethical sense, a lie in the juristic sense, and a lie in the sense of right explained, it is possible to look at the different duties not to lie in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, the Critique of Practical Reason, The Metaphysics of Morals, and On a Supposed Right to Lie from Philanthropy. However, once again, he does not say which sense of a lie he has in mind, and hence, which duty not to lie he has in mind.
The example of a lie that he gives—a lie to get money—is an untruthful statement made to a particular other person with the intention that this person believe it to be true and be harmed by believing it to be true by depriving him of what is rightfully his, namely, his money. It is a lie in all three senses of a lie. Hence, the duty not to lie in question could be a broad ethical duty, a narrower duty of right, or an even narrower juristic duty.
The rule as so stated clearly does not require anyone to answer every question that he is asked. The positive formulation of the rule, as well as the negative formulation, leaves it open to one to be silent. In the Doctrine of Virtue, pt. As Mary J. This would appear to make the duty in question either a duty of right or a juristic duty, and not a directly ethical duty.
First, an ethical duty not to lie would prohibit all lies in the ethical sense, including lies to oneself; however, the perfect duty to others not to lie to others does not prohibit all lies in the ethical sense, since it does not prohibit lies to oneself.
Some commentators have argued that the duty at issue is a juristic duty: The illustration of perfect duties to others—the duty not to promise false- ly—is a prototype for the duties of justice which are later elaborated in the Rechtslehre.
0コメント