In March , they found such a means. Schlieffen's ideas were largely aimed at operational-level leaders, that is, the commanders of Germany's divisions and army corps. The biggest problems in World War One, however, were at the lower, tactical level. And the German solution to these problems was to apply Schlieffen's operational principles to small units as well as to large ones.
Thus, by decentralising command and by increasing the firepower of the infantry, they created a large number of platoon-sized units capable of independent action on the battlefield. These units had the freedom to fight as they thought best, without having to refer constantly to a higher commander. While the Allies relied upon tanks to break through the stalemate of the trenches in , the Germans used a largely infantry force empowered by a sound tactical doctrine.
After their defeat in , German military intellectuals began reshaping the army. Under the direction of Hans von Seeckt, commanders fashioned the doctrine that the Wehrmacht was to employ in World War Two. Repelled by the waste and indecisiveness of trench warfare, they returned to the ideas of Schlieffen, and in the army published its new doctrine, Command and Combat with Combined Arms.
And as military technology, including that of tanks, motor vehicles, aircraft and radios, was developed during the s and 30s, so it was grafted onto this doctrinal framework.
Innovators such as Heinz Guderian and Erich von Manstein recognised that the protection given by tanks increased the ability of the German army to manoeuvre in the face of enemy artillery, and that this enhanced speed and mobility. However, the modern technology was merely used to enhance the capabilities that had already been provided, thanks to the army's strategic doctrine. Thus, unlike the Allied armies, the German army in had an offensive doctrine that emphasised speed of decision-making, speed of manoeuvre and decentralised action.
From the operational ideas of Schlieffen they placed the emphasis on speed, flank attacks, encirclements and decisive battle. The experience of World War One had convinced German leaders that these ideas needed to be applied not only at top operational level, but also at the tactical level - by combined-arms teams capable of independent fire and manoeuvre. Tanks, motor vehicles and aircraft merely enabled the Wehrmacht to apply these principles more efficiently.
With this doctrine, despite being outnumbered in tanks and combat aircraft, they were able to outfight the Allies at every turn in , and cause the rapid and total collapse of Allied resistance. Germany and World War Two, Vol. Search term:. Read more.
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This page has been archived and is no longer updated. Find out more about page archiving. On this page Hitler dictates terms Allies unprepared German tactics New form of warfare? Furthermore, as a result of the allied naval blockade, Germany was on the brink of starvation. Unrest and labor strikes had become common in German cities. Ludendorff believed that they had only one last chance to strike a decisive blow against the allies before it was too late.
He was a realist and knew that the situation was grave for Germany. Ludendorff decided to use these divisions in his last offensive and force the Allies to sue for peace. Germany first shifted fifty divisions by rail from the east to the western front. Ludendorff decided that the goal of the offensive would be to divide the British and the French armies. The British were mainly based in northern France, while the French army was located in the center and east of France.
The Germans wanted to drive a wedge between the British and the French. They intended to drive the British back to the Channel Ports.
Concurrently, the German command planned to seize the remaining ports in Belgium. They hoped that by defeating the British that they would seek peace terms with Germany and after capitulating, the French would be forced to negotiate with Berlin. Also, this outcome would persuade the Americans to seek a negotiated settlement with the Germans.
The Germans knew that it was almost impossible for them to achieve outright victory and that their only hope was some form of advantageous negotiated settlement.
The German strategy relied on the widespread use of Stormtrooper units and formations. The Stormtroopers were the elite forces of the German army. The best men were used to form these units, and they received specialized training and advanced weaponry. The German command hoped that the Stormtroopers would quickly occupy key strategic positions. The speed of the Stormtroopers was expected to deliver victory on the western front.
The Germans also used short, massive bombardments before the assaults, a tactic that had been previously used with great success on the eastern front. The Offensive took place throughout one hundred days, and four or five major battles are identifiable during this phase of the war. The first major operation of the Spring Offensive was Operation Michael. By the end of the first day, the British had suffered some 50, casualties, and the Germans had broken through at several points.
The British Fifth Army after two days was in full retreat and the Third Army was also forced to withdraw from its positions as its commanders feared being surrounded by the Germans. The French dispatched several divisions to halt the German advance, and they helped to slow and eventually to halt the German advance.
The German attack had achieved real and substantive gains, but it was not a decisive defeat for the British in particular, who regrouped and established a new line of defenses.
This shift left them very weak on their flanks, especially in the sectors around the Channel Ports. The Germans targeted the Portuguese Second Division. The Portuguese were spread very thin and expected to hold a very long line.
The Germans launched a brutal artillery assault on their positions, and the Portuguese Division fled. The Stormtroopers soon entered the breach in the line and pushed several miles towards the Channel Port of Dunkirk. Fearing that they were being outflanked, the British Divisions withdrew and formed a new defensive line on the River Lys.
It was feared that if this line did not hold, then the Germans could press forward and take the Channel Ports. What complicated matters further would play out in real-time once the British army was in North America.
Command of the army was complex and divided in a way that made communicating orders difficult to the point of detrimental to achieving set-forth objectives. Sir William Howe took command in the fall of and was given his orders. But Howe, like most military officers of the time, exhibited a sense of leeway when making decisions in the field that were often counterproductive to the overall objectives of the British war machine.
He was not alone. His successor, Sir Henry Clinton , did the same, as well as Gen. John Burgoyne. And we are assuming, incorrectly, that these commanders got along with one other. Appointments and elevated egos that challenged rivals within the army did lead to instances where orders were either changed, disobeyed or flatly ignored. The army and navy might have received initial orders that paralleled each other, but if a commanding officer or admiral abruptly changed course, the other would often find himself waiting to receive orders from London to verify this change.
And London had not made this decision; it was done by the commander in North America on his own. At a time where communication was only as fast as the wind could carry a ship, we can see how maddening this could be for trying to achieve a military objective.
We must also recall how at the outset of the war, British officers in North America were tasked with issuing pardons to colonists who swore allegiance to the King. Some, like Sir William Howe, were even allowed to initiate diplomatic talks with American representatives. But these were clearly one-sided; Howe had no real authority in brokering a peace treaty and was mainly there to show the American emissaries that London was not going to stand down.
Short of them renouncing the rebellion and the Declaration of Independence , the Americans would not be afforded a meeting to negotiate terms for separation. Another tactic used by British officials was to purposely stoke the fears of slave insurrections throughout the colonies. It is not known how many former slaves left their plantations and came across British lines, but we do know that many were not allowed to fight and were given manual labor jobs instead , and several thousand settled in Nova Scotia and in western Africa following the end of the war.
On the western outskirts of the colonies, British detachments were put there to gain the trust of Native American groups — many of whom looked upon the English favorably and viewed the Americans as hostile invaders. Let us acknowledge that British advantages in having the best trained and equipped military in the world were no match for realities on the ground. Weather played a huge factor in eighteenth-century military operations.
It was unduly to expect a major engagement in the winter months because of the risk of exposure and the conditions of roads, which often were impassible with snow. Torrential thunderstorms and downpours could wreak havoc on flintlock muskets and powder stores. And the humid, intense summer heat could be more devastating to an army than a bayonet charge. The wool-coated, sixty-pound backpack wearing, ten-pound musket carrying soldier, on the march for miles before an engagement, was often the victim of the elements rather than enemy fire.
Other conditions required immediate attention. Firewood was often needed to keep soldiers warm in the winter months and to cook food daily. Both armies were guilty of clearing out thousands of trees over the duration of the war. In more desperate instances, fences, barns, and houses were torn down to retrieve whatever wood they could get. Disease, particularly smallpox, was rampant in both army camps.
Inoculation provided some protection, but poor health and sanitation conditions were a common feature of encampments. Both sides tried through the course of the war to disrupt and destroy these precious cargo roads. For the British Army, however, the disruption came at an even greater cost.
The sheer size of the Atlantic Ocean created a logistical nightmare for resupplying the troops. It could take months for a fully-loaded ship to arrive off the American coast, and several more for its contents to reach a British encampment embedded in the hostile countryside. The amount of food required to feed an army is staggering. Also note that armies had several hundreds, if not thousands, of horses and cattle at any given time for personnel and pulling supply wagons.
These animals required hay, oats, and feed too. As a result, the British army turned to foraging, or seizing livestock and homespun supplies from the local citizenry. But cases of vandalism and rape by British soldiers often undid these moments of charity.
To complicate matters further, the Continental army foraged too. Citizens were being asked to contribute what they could to whoever the occupying force knocked on their door.
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